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I

n November 2003, Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, persuaded Washington to speed up the transfer of power to representative Iraqi bodies, not least as a response to the worsening security
situation in the country. Bremer’s initial proposals were partly abandoned in
the face of opposition on the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) and particularly
from Iraq’s Shiite leadership. The interim agreement eventually arrived at by
the IGC’s membership in early March 2004 determined that direct elections
must take place by 31 January 2005. In early June 2004 the membership of
Iraq’s interim government to take over on 1 July was announced.
Given that eight of the 33-member interim government are ethnic
Kurds, these arrangements suggest a secure place in the evolving post-Saddam
Iraq for the Kurds of northern Iraq. Furthermore, the interim constitution, or
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), that emerged from the Iraqi Governing Council in March, in accordance with which Iraq is expected to be governed until a permanent constitution is drawn up by an elected National
Assembly during 2005, is also generally regarded as favorable to the Kurds.1 It
recognizes the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) as the official government for the interim period of the three ethnically Kurdish northern Iraqi provinces over which it has presided since 1992, and the federal nature of Iraq’s
transitional administration. Kurdish is designated as one of Iraq’s two official
languages, along with Arabic. Even in light of the decree banning the various
militias in Iraq announced by the new interim government in early June, the
Kurdish peshmerga, the largest of Iraq’s private forces, will be permitted to
function as an internal security and police force in the KRG zone.2 In any case,
it is doubtful the decree will be enforceable for some time. The Transitional
18
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Administrative Law gives the green light to some managed resettlement back
to their place of origin both of Kurds displaced by Saddam’s “Arabization” of
the north and of Arabs (mostly Shiite) who moved there as a consequence of it,
and affords considerable scope for the primacy of local law above federal law.
It also states that a referendum on a permanent constitution would fail if twothirds of the voters in three or more governorates—principally a reference to
the KRG zone—were to reject it.
The fate of Kirkuk, on the other hand, is deferred until after a permanent constitution has been settled and a census held in the region, and the
Transitional Administrative Law permits up to a maximum of three of the 18
provinces to join together to form a “region,” thus prohibiting the formation
of a larger KRG zone. Nevertheless, the Shiites balked at signing the interim
constitution, largely as a consequence of their opposition to concessions
made to the Kurds.3 Ankara too reiterated to Washington its oft-stated concerns about Kurdish aspirations.4 There also have been indications of increased Shiite and Turkmen armed militancy in Kirkuk,5 not least by the
followers of Sheik Muqtada al-Sadr.6 Concessions the Kurds feel they have
made appear to have been insufficient to assuage the doubts of others.
Prior to Ambassador Bremer’s November 2003 plan, the Kurdish
preference had been to first entrench federal arrangements guaranteeing
Kurdish autonomy before the introduction of democracy into Iraq. Their reasoning was clear. Kurds make up at most one-fifth of the Iraqi population, and
are greatly outnumbered by the Arab majority. Shiite Arabs alone constitute
around 60 percent of the Iraqi population. This demography explained initial
Shiite support for, and Kurdish opposition to, direct elections in the formation
of the Transitional National Assembly.7 Iraq’s permanent constitution will
now be determined only after nationwide elections have taken place, and it is
unclear that these interim arrangements will be carried over in light of the
continued unhappiness of the Shiite leadership in particular with their terms.
For this reason, Iraq’s two Kurdish leaders, Masoud Barzani and Jalal
Talibani, sent a wide-ranging letter to President Bush on 1 June 2004 expressing unhappiness with, among many other grievances, the draft US-UK resolution put to the UN Security Council in late May 2004, because it failed to refer
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to the contents of the Transitional Administrative Law. The letter threatened a
Kurdish withdrawal from the central government—in effect, Kurdish independence from Iraq—if the TAL is not incorporated into a permanent constitution.8 Shiite leader Ayatollah Ali Sistani, on the other hand, successfully
warned against including references to the TAL in the United Nations resolution, which in early June and to Kurdish anger was unanimously passed in this
form.9 It is evident that a great deal remains to be settled in Iraq.

Kurdish Aspirations
The Kurdish aspiration that Iraq should be organized as an ethnicallybased federation dates back at least to the Kurdish Regional Government’s establishment in 1992. A draft constitution adopted by Iraq’s two Kurdish parties
in 2002 envisaged that the oil-bearing Iraqi Kurdish provinces to the south of
the KRG zone would be incorporated into any future Kurdish self-governing
area within a loose Iraqi federal framework, that Kirkuk should be the Kurdish
capital, that the Kurds would retain control over their own armed forces (the
peshmerga), and that the proposed Kurdish state should have the constitutional
right to secede.10 In December 2003, the Kurdish leadership sent a proposal
along these lines to the Iraqi Governing Council, where it was met with profound disapproval.11 As Henry Kissinger has put it, “Kurds define selfgovernment as only microscopically distinguishable from independence.”12
The more than a decade of self-rule which Iraqi Kurds have exercised
in Iraq’s three northernmost provinces appears to have strengthened Kurdish
determination to seize the historic opportunity presented by Iraq’s current circumstances to cement their autonomy. Notwithstanding the violent conflict between the two governing factions during the mid-1990s, Iraq’s self-governing
Kurdish provinces have thrived relative both to the rest of Iraq and to the period
preceding the establishment of the KRG. This has been due partly to the
UN-administered share of the now terminated oil-for-food income that was allocated to the KRG, and partly through smuggling and other illegal and
semi-legal activities, the scope of which has now dramatically reduced with the
lifting of sanctions against Iraq. Although the KRG has by no means enjoyed a
perfect democracy, there has been little of the repression, lawlessness, and anarchy that has been the sad fate of so much of the rest of Iraq since the first Gulf
War up to the present time, and the autonomous period has seen commendable
improvements in the region’s infrastructure. More pointedly, the KRG also has
represented Kurdish freedom from Arab, Turkish, or Iranian repression.13
In an effort to strengthen their bargaining position and to lay the
foundation for the single Kurdish entity they envisage will eventually form a
loose federation with Iraq’s Arab provinces, the KRG’s two governing par20
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ties are speeding up the creation of a single Kurdish government in the
north.14 Since Saddam’s overthrow, they also have enjoyed de facto control of
those areas beyond the KRG zone and to which they lay claim as part of their
expanded Kurdish zone, such as Kirkuk and much of Mosul province.15 Demographic squabbles and ethnic tensions have simmered in the region, especially in Kirkuk, as the Kurds have endeavored to reverse Saddam’s policy of
Arabization and resettle displaced Kurds. These tensions have periodically
spilled over into violence, notably in August 2003 and in the following December and January. During this latter outbreak, Arabs and Turkmen fought
alongside each other against Kurds, and US forces were obliged to impose a
curfew. As talks on the interim constitution heated up, the Kurdish leadership
intensified its insistence on self rule,16 and a petition demanding a referendum
on Kurdish autonomy attracted almost two million signatures.17
There are indications that the Kurdish leaders may have gone out on a
limb with their own constituency in the concessions they have made, notably
concerning control over future oil revenues, incorporation of Kirkuk and other
lands deemed traditionally Kurdish, and the extent of Kurdish independence
generally.18 The Kurdish leadership has fully participated in US initiatives in
Iraq since the demise of Saddam’s regime. They held five of the 25 seats on the
Iraqi Governing Council and a number of ministerial posts too, including that
of foreign minister under Hoshyar Zebari. This is given additional significance
by the fact that, unlike so many of the IGC’s Arab members, and those of the
new interim government, the Kurdish leaders are not returned exiles but
elected representatives of their populations who head well-organized political
parties and armed militias. Furthermore, in the war to remove Saddam, the
Kurdish peshmerga cooperated closely with US forces in the north, securing
the runways used by American airborne troops dropped into northern Iraq, engaging with Iraqi forces, liberating Mosul and Kirkuk, handing nominal control of these areas over to American forces, and, since then, ensuring that the
areas under their control have been relatively trouble-free and secure. In return,
the Kurds have sought, and expected, sympathy and support for their goals.
The June letter to President Bush from Barzani and Talibani makes it clear they
feel let down by Washington, as do many Iraqi Kurds.

Ankara’s Fears
US diplomacy in Iraq has been reflective of the wider US responsibility for the future of Iraq, and has taken into account both majority Iraqi and
broader regional opposition to extensive Kurdish autonomy, most notably and
vociferously from NATO ally Turkey, where about half of all ethnic Kurds live.
Although the KRG’s autonomous zone was afforded protection by the US and
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“A petition demanding a referendum on
Kurdish autonomy attracted almost
two million signatures.”

UK-enforced “no fly zone” based at Incirlik in Turkey, and although Turkish
security forces had in effect enjoyed a free hand in their struggle with activists
in the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) based on the Iraqi side of the mountainous border
with Turkey, Ankara never fully acclimatized itself to the existence of the
KRG.19 Turkey feared the KRG might serve as a pole of attraction for Turkey’s
restive Kurds, or that it might become emboldened enough to lend them direct
support. It could garner international sympathy for the idea of wider Kurdish
national self-determination, possibly leading ultimately to a sovereign Kurdish state. Ankara has long feared that a fully independent and sovereign
Kurdish state could emerge by design or by default, and this would threaten not
only Turkish territorial integrity but an unravelling of the region as a whole.
Indeed, as US plans to take military action against Saddam Hussein
took shape during 2002 and early 2003, Ankara intensified its warnings to
Washington that war could raise the risk of an enlarged, oil-rich, and more autonomous if not fully independent Kurdish self-governing entity emerging in
northern Iraqi territory—whether by design, default, or through opportunistic
exploitation of chaos and uncertainty. For a time, Turkish military intervention
in northern Iraq designed in part to forestall such an eventuality was a prospect
sufficiently realistic enough for the Bush Administration to feel compelled to
warn Ankara against it. Ankara’s unease with the possible consequences of US
military action contributed to the 1 March 2003 vote by the Turkish National
Assembly that denied US forces access to Turkish territory.20
Fearful both of its own diplomatic isolation and of the possible regional ramifications of Iraq’s fragmentation, Ankara also has conducted an
uncharacteristically active diplomatic campaign in the Middle East region,
giving rise to suspicions that a major shift in Turkish foreign policy could be
under way.21 Thus, in January 2003 Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul
initiated and hosted a summit in Istanbul attended by Egypt, Syria, Jordan,
Saudi Arabia, and Iran, aimed both at finding alternatives to war and at explaining Ankara’s perspective on the Kurdish issue. Subsequent gatherings
have been held in Riyadh, Tehran, Damascus, and, most recently, in Kuwait in
22
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February 2004. This loose regional alliance broadly shares Ankara’s unease
concerning possible Kurdish aspirations for greater independence, and has
been incorporated into a UN Advisory Group by the UN Secretary General.22
Ankara has made particularly diligent efforts to align its position with
those of Iran and Syria, producing bilateral declarations in support of Iraq’s territorial integrity and against the Kurdish preference for an ethnically-based
Iraqi federation. Turkish, Syrian, and Iranian unease is also bound to intensify
in light of the extensive rioting by Iranian Kurds that greeted the signing of the
TAL in Iraq,23 the recent disturbances in Syria’s Kurdish-populated areas,24 and
the PKK’s announcement of the end of its cease-fire and the associated increase in violence in Turkey’s southeast.25

A Still Uncertain Future for Iraqi Kurds
The US preference for a strongly unified Iraq that is administratively
rather than ethnically federal is partly rooted in the need to reassure Turkey.
Ankara has repeatedly sought reassurance concerning Washington’s commitment to Iraq’s territorial integrity—for example, during the January 2004
visit to Washington of Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign
Minister Abdullah Gul. Concurrently with the Washington visit, US Deputy
Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz argued in an interview with senior Turkish
commentators that “some degree of . . . federalism or federation is probably
going to be inevitable, but that should be based on administrative and geographic lines, not on ethnic lines. Our message to the Kurds is your future
doesn’t lie in separating yourselves from the Iraqis.”26
However, the interim agreement of early March leaves Iraq’s future,
and the position of the Kurds in it, largely unresolved. There could, of course,
be benefits for the Kurds in reintegrating the KRG zone into a unified Iraq,
and the Kurdish leadership does indeed continue to declare its commitment to
Iraq’s future unity. The termination of the sanctions and the oil-for-food program with the removal of Saddam’s regime might render independence unsustainable in any case. Reintegration could afford Kurdish leaders the
opportunity to weave themselves into the country’s political fabric, following
on from their participation in Iraq’s interim arrangements.
Kurds might also benefit from any economic recovery enjoyed by a
post-Saddam, stable, and sovereign Iraq. Softening their stance on autonomy
would enable them to avoid the wrath of Iraq’s neighbors, particularly Turkey, and even win their gratitude. In any case, Kurdish economic well-being
remains largely at the mercy of Ankara and other neighboring states. Ethnically mixed areas such as Kirkuk and Mosul could develop power-sharing
arrangements between the various factions making up the populations there,
as will presumably happen in Baghdad and other multi-ethnic areas.
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The drawbacks of such an arrangement would be that Kurdish autonomy would be less than the virtual independence enjoyed for the past decade or
so. The Kurds would also once again be at the mercy of Iraq’s Arab majority, a
hitherto unhappy experience. A Shiite-dominated Iraq might bring problems of
its own for the relatively secular Kurds, not least an Iraq based on Islamic
Sharia law. The interim constitution, while declaring that any law contradicting the tenets of Islam will be impermissible, identifies Islam as a, but not the,
source of legislation in the new Iraq. On the other hand, there are grounds for
doubting that the Shiite leadership will be satisfied with these limitations, as
the future role of Islam in Iraq contributed both to the heat generated by the
preparation of the TAL and the Shiite delay in signing the agreement.27
In any case, there appears to have been little softening of the Kurdish
insistence on autonomy. Kurdish nationalism is now a genie out of the bottle,
and Iraqi Kurds generally seem indisposed to risk their autonomy on the alter
of an Arab-dominated Iraq. In addition to the historically unprecedented opportunity offered by the present situation, the pressure of circumstances in
Iraq and the intervening obstacles that must be overcome look formidably
discouraging. Arab Iraq remains distinctly unstable, and it is not yet certain
that a functioning political system will emerge into which the Kurds could integrate even if they were in principle prepared to do so. In a set of circumstances in which civil war or, possibly more likely, armed and violent chaos
constantly threatens, the Kurds are unlikely to agree to disband their longestablished militias in any foreseeable future. Nor will other Iraqi factions.28
Washington’s officially upbeat line is not mirrored everywhere, and there is a
sense that events could spiral beyond US control.29
Arrangements in northern Iraq also will hinge on the fraught and
contested demography of the area. Kurds were certainly the majority in
Kirkuk in 1957, and are almost certainly the largest single group today,30 although the Turkish-backed Iraqi Turkmen Front has claimed that this honor
falls to the Turkmen.31 Kurdish victims of Saddam’s population transfers
have been returning to the north in significant numbers, welcomed by the
Kurdish authorities who control the area, though not necessarily by coalition
forces.32 If the Kurds succeed in “creating facts” in the north, then they might
achieve their objectives through the ballot box, although there is bound to be
resistance from the Arabs and Turkmen, who would be the losers. Intensified
inter-communal tension in the north is thus foreseeable.

Towards Iraq’s End?
Events could easily slip from Washington’s grasp. This possibility
has encouraged some US analysts to ask difficult questions. Among the most
eminent is Leslie Gelb, who has argued that the Iraqi state, created as it was
24
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“Ankara has long feared that a fully independent
and sovereign Kurdish state could emerge
by design or by default.”

from three distinct Ottoman provinces by the British, possesses no natural
unity. Only the oil-less Sunni Arab minority, who have dominated Iraq since its
inception, have a stake in its survival. Gelb has proposed that the US encourage
a three-state solution to Iraqi disorder, and he takes events in post-Tito Yugoslavia as his guide.33 Henry Kissinger shares some of Gelb’s pessimism about
the chances of Iraqi unity, and has argued, “It may be that like Yugoslavia, Iraq,
created for geostrategic reasons, cannot be held together by representative institutions, that it will tend towards autocracy or break up into its constituent
parts.”34 He too concludes that “a breakup into three states is preferable to refereeing an open-ended civil war.” Former US Ambassador Peter Galbraith is another who has openly contemplated the prospect of Iraq’s ethnic breakup as a
least-bad option.35
A fragmentation of Iraq would pose profound policy problems. As
Kissinger asks, would the United States be prepared to support an autocracy in
Iraq, the historically tried and tested way of holding the country together?
What would the domestic American reaction be to any violent suppression of
Kurdish aspirations for self-determination by such a regime, particularly in the
light of Kurdish support and welcome for the United States in Saddam’s overthrow? Can the denial of Kurdish self-determination be squared with the Bush
Administration’s declared commitment to the democratization of the Middle
East region as a whole? Would the United States feel that the emergence of a
Shiite-dominated, theocratic, and probably unfriendly Iraqi regime—which
given Shiite demographic preponderance is an outcome that could emerge
even via the ballot box—be worth the blood, treasure, and American political
capital that has been expended on it, and be worth denying the Kurds their right
to self-rule?

Problems for US-Turkish Relations
In the face of the dilemmas that could be thrown up, US reaction
might hinge on the Turkish response, for whom a breakup of Iraq might be
seen as a first-order strategic threat. As already noted, Turkey was initially
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opposed to US military action against Iraq because of fears over the ramifications for the Kurdish issue. As it became clear that the United States was determined to oust Saddam militarily, a substantial Turkish military force was
built up on Iraq’s borders, refusing US command, and ready to intervene unilaterally should the Kurds transgress Ankara’s so-called “red lines” by moving toward the Kirkuk and Mosul oilfields or toward political independence.
Turks also asserted their guardianship toward the Turkmen ethnic minority in
northern Iraq, and more recently Ankara objected to the TAL partly because
of the insufficient attention it pays to the rights of Turkmen.36
In the wake of the US invasion, and with a tightening Kurdish grip on
northern Iraq, the Turks have been largely on the outside looking in, seemingly without a clearly defined policy. This frustrating and unstable situation
has sometimes put the relationship between the two NATO allies at further
risk. This was amply demonstrated by the furor surrounding the 4 July 2003
arrest by US forces of 11 Turkish special forces commandos and a number of
Turkish and Turkmen civilians during a raid on a building in Sulaymaniyah,
northern Iraq, on the basis of intelligence reports that the Turks were engaged
in “disturbing activities.” The establishment of a US-Turkish commission to
investigate the incident did not prevent General Hilmi Ozkok, Chief of Turkey’s General Staff, from characterizing the incident as heralding “the biggest crisis of confidence” between the two sides.37
Turkey’s enforced reliance on US troops and Kurdish peshmerga to
confront the estimated 5,000 or so PKK separatists holding out in the mountains of northern Iraq has further augmented Ankara’s displeasure. In autumn
2003 Washington agreed to take on the PKK presence in Iraq on Ankara’s behalf. Although this gesture enjoyed the declared support of the Iraqi Kurdish
leadership, little will or capacity to invest in this mission has been evident. In
January 2004, Turkish General Ilker Basburg, who had helped negotiate the
agreement, declared that “the US’s fight against the PKK is not meeting our
expectation.”38 Abdullah Gul repeated the complaint in May.39 Ankara’s discontent could mount were this issue to remain unaddressed, particularly in
light of the recent revival of PKK violence.
Turkey’s relations with Iraq’s Kurds are often fraught. Again, a demonstration of this was offered as a consequence of last autumn’s US encouragement of, and inclination to accept, Ankara’s offer of up to 10,000 troops to
assist in the post-Saddam peacekeeping mission in Iraq. By November 2003 it
had become manifestly evident that a Turkish troop presence would do more
harm than good, as the Kurds threatened to resist militarily the introduction or
even transit farther south of Turkish peacekeepers.40 This echoed a similar
Kurdish threat to resist a Turkish troop presence in northern Iraq which, it was
rumored, the United States had agreed to on the eve of the invasion of Iraq.
26
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“Kurdish nationalism is now a
genie out of the bottle.”

Nor has Ankara’s stridency with respect to the aspirations of Iraq’s
Kurds abated, notwithstanding the latter’s repeated reassurances that they intend to remain an integral part of Iraq. The issue was at the top of Turkey’s
agenda during the January trip to Washington, on the eve of which Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan warned the Kurds not to play with fire, and
threatened that Syria, Iran, and Turkey were in agreement that neighboring
states might intervene should a breakup of Iraq look imminent.41 General
Basbug warned that an ethnically-based Iraqi federation would be “difficult
and bloody.”42 Henry Kissinger has plausibly speculated, “If Kurdish autonomy goes beyond a certain point, there is a not negligible threat of a Turkish
military intervention, perhaps backed by Iran.”43

A Turkish Intervention?
Turkish military action against the Kurds of Iraq could conceivably
be prompted by a crossing of Ankara’s “red lines”—excessive Kurdish autonomy, particularly of an expanded Kurdish zone incorporating Kirkuk. A future drawdown of US troops in Iraq, or an Arab Iraq either in chaos or itself
seeking to rein in Kurdish ambitions, might be seen as contexts permissive to
Turkish military intervention. Ankara would surely seek, and possibly receive, a degree of regional sympathy, so long as Ankara was not itself suspected of expansionism.
Turkey is not invariably trusted by its neighbors, however, and an occasional whiff of irredentism can hint at a more sinister twist to Turkey’s approach to Iraqi Kurdistan. Turks have occasionally resurrected an earlier
resentment at the loss of Mosul and Kirkuk as a result of the 1923 Lausanne
Treaty. In 1986 Ankara apparently warned the United States and Iran that it
would demand the return of Mosul and Kirkuk in the event of disorder in Iraq as
a consequence of the Iran-Iraq War.44 During the Gulf War, President Turgut
Ozal had similarly mused about historic Turkish claims to the region in the
event of an Iraqi collapse.45 In August 2002, Defense Minister Sabahattin
Cakmakoglu, admittedly a member of the far right National Action Party
(MHP), chose to remark that Iraqi Kurdistan had been “forcibly separated”
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from Turkey (by the British) at the time of the republic’s founding in 1923, and
that Ankara retained a protective interest in the fate of the region.46 As military
action against Iraq approached, the then-Foreign Minister of the new Justice
and Development Party (AKP) government, Yasar Yakis, apparently sought
legal clarification of the status of Mosul and Kirkuk,47 and a leading Turkish
commentator pointed out that Mosul and Kirkuk were ceded to Iraq, not to any
Kurdish state that might subsequently emerge.48 More recently, former Turkish
President Suleyman Demirel expressed regret that Turkey was denied Mosul
by the 1923 Lausanne agreement.49 It would be fanciful to build a prediction
upon so disjointed a set of utterances, although some Kurds might. But it does
serve as a reminder of the potentially explosive situation that now exists in
northern Iraq.
Iraqi Kurds would fiercely resist any Turkish invasion, a prospect
that might itself serve as a deterrent. This would certainly deny to Turkey the
possibility of turning Iraqi Kurdistan into a kind of northern Cyprus, compliantly semi-annexed. In the event of a long stay, global diplomatic opposition
and mischief-making by neighboring states would grow. The United States in
particular would be compromised, and could hardly be expected to stay uninvolved. Were US troops still present in the region, both Washington and Ankara would wish desperately to avoid a clash. In such a scenario, it could not
be ruled out.
The best hope is that Iraq proves able to arrive at an arrangement that
satisfies both the broader requirement for Iraq’s territorial integrity and stability on the one hand, and Kurdish demands for a degree of self-determination on
the other. This could still happen. As yet incomplete and uncertain changes
may be under way in Turkey too, as the military appears to be adopting a lower
profile and the country readies itself for European Union accession. The
security-driven, militarized approach to the Kurds, both domestically and in
Iraq, could give way to a more nuanced and sophisticated policy on Ankara’s
part. Poor Turkish-Kurdish relations need not be a given, and there has indeed
been cooperation and consultation between Ankara and Iraq’s Kurds for some
time, in particular on economic issues and on the PKK presence in northern
Iraq. In any case, a land-locked Iraqi Kurdistan can acquire enormous benefit
from good relations with Turkey, and suffer enormous harm in their absence.
There have even been reports of a future Turkish protectorate over an autonomous Iraqi Kurdish entity.50

Some Broader Considerations
Much of the analysis offered here is predicated on the basis of a continued failure to achieve stability in Iraq. There are indeed reasons to be pessimistic. As for the implications for US-Turkish relations, the primary post-Cold
28
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War value of Turkey to Washington has been its proximity to Iraq. The lesson
that access to Turkey’s real estate can be denied by a parliamentary vote is a
profound one. Furthermore, Turkey’s democratization might combine with divergent regional interests to render less likely the adoption by Ankara of positions complementary to those of Washington. Indeed, this is a lesson that might
apply to the Middle East generally, should the Bush Administration’s aspirations to transform it bear fruit.
In the wake of Saddam’s overthrow, and the consequent removal of
the need to contain Iraq, it was likely that US-Turkish relations would change
in character regardless of US-Turkish differences and become, in Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz’s words, less focused on military cooperation, and
instead derived from “the common values, the common beliefs in secular democracy.”51 Washington has long held Turkey up as a model for other Islamic
states to emulate, and this inclination will surely strengthen in the context of
the Bush Administration’s aspiration to democratize the region as a means of
stabilizing it. However, it is less than self-evident that the Turkish experience
is, or is perceived as, at all relevant or attractive to the rest of the region. In any
case, democracy, stability, and pro-US sympathies are not necessarily bedfellows in the Middle East.
In short, the pieces of the jigsaw thrown up by the US-led regime
change in Baghdad are yet to hit the ground, and Washington might yet have
to reap what it has sown—in Kurdistan in particular.
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